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|Title:||Electoral competition with privately informed players||Authors:||Chatterjee, Kalyan
|Keywords:||Political science;Electoral competition||Issue Date:||16-Aug-2011||Publisher:||Indian Institute of Management Bangalore||Project:||Electoral competition with privately informed players||Series/Report no.:||IIMB_PR_2011-12_014||Abstract:||We study a model of electoral competition with office-seeking players and sincere voting. Players announce a policy position in a one-dimensional policy space but have private information about their true types that a effct policy outcomes in other dimensions. A policy announcement is then capable of signalling a player's type. Voters are Bayesian. We characterise the set of equilibria that arise in the announced dimension.||URI:||https://repository.iimb.ac.in/handle/2074/21404|
|Appears in Collections:||2011-2012|
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