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Title: Electoral competition with privately informed players
Authors: Chatterjee, Kalyan 
Bhalla, Manaswini 
Keywords: Political science;Electoral competition
Issue Date: 16-Aug-2011
Publisher: Indian Institute of Management Bangalore
Project: Electoral competition with privately informed players 
Series/Report no.: IIMB_PR_2011-12_014
Abstract: We study a model of electoral competition with office-seeking players and sincere voting. Players announce a policy position in a one-dimensional policy space but have private information about their true types that a effct policy outcomes in other dimensions. A policy announcement is then capable of signalling a player's type. Voters are Bayesian. We characterise the set of equilibria that arise in the announced dimension.
Appears in Collections:2011-2012

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