Electoral competition with privately informed players


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Issue DateTitleSub-TitleAuthor(s)Journal NameVolume NumberIssue NumberPages
116-Aug-2011Electoral competition with privately informed players-Chatterjee, Kalyan ; Bhalla, Manaswini 

Abstract
We study a model of electoral competition with office-seeking players and sincere voting. Players announce a policy position in a one-dimensional policy space but have private information about their true types that a effct policy outcomes in other dimensions. A policy announcement is then capable of signalling a player's type. Voters are Bayesian. We characterise the set of equilibria that arise in the announced dimension.
 
Keyword(s)
Political science
Electoral competition
Project title
Electoral competition with privately informed players
Project Coordinator
 
Status
Completed
Expected Completion
16-08-2011
 
Co-Investigator(s)