Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Bandhu, Sarvesh
dc.contributor.author	Mondal, Bishwajyoti
dc.contributor.author	Pramanik, Anup
dc.date.accessioned	2024-02-20T05:55:28Z	-
dc.date.available	2024-02-20T05:55:28Z	-
dc.date.issued	2022
dc.identifier.issn	0165-1765
dc.identifier.issn	1873-7374
dc.identifier.uri	https://repository.iimb.ac.in/handle/2074/22257	-
dc.description.abstract	In this paper, we provide a complete characterization of preference domains on which the Unanimity with Status-quo rule is strategy-proof. Further, we introduce a notion of “conflicting preference domains” and show that the Unanimity with Status-quo rule defined over these domains is strategy-proof.
dc.publisher	Elsevier
dc.subject	Voting
dc.subject	Strategy-proofness
dc.subject	Unanimity with status-quo rules
dc.subject	Conflicting preference domains
dc.title	Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains
dc.type	Journal Article
dc.identifier.doi	10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110164
dc.pages	AN:110164
dc.vol.no	Vol.210
dc.journal.name	Economics Letters
Appears in Collections:	2020-2029 C

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