Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://repository.iimb.ac.in/handle/2074/14984
Title: Ethnic conflicts, rumours and an informed agent
Authors: Basu, Pathikrit 
Dutta, Souvik 
Shekhar, Suraj 
Keywords: Ethnic conflicts;Cheap talk;Multiple audiences;Private signals;Pay off externalities
Issue Date: 2014
Conference: 33rd Australasian Economic Theory Workshop, 12-13 February, 2015, Deakin University, Melbourne 
Abstract: Rumours often precipitate ethnic conflicts and cause immense damage to life and property. There may exist an agent who knows if the rumour is true or false. We analyze a cheap talk game with multiple audiences (ethnicities) to see how this informed agent (b) may influence the outcome of rumours by sending strategic signals. Since b is biased towards her own ethnicity, she finds it difficult to convince the other ethnicity that she is giving them correct information. We show that even if b is known to be biased towards her own ethnicity, peace is possible in equilibrium. Additionally, we prove that there are only three equilibrium outcomes possible in symmetric strategies. Conflict is inevitable in one. The other outcomes have the following features. One, there may be peace whenever b deems it possible. Two, while b gives more informative signals to her own ethnicity, she may misinform a segment of her own ethnicity in equilibrium.
URI: https://repository.iimb.ac.in/handle/2074/14984
Appears in Collections:2010-2019 P

Show full item record

Google ScholarTM

Check


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.