Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://repository.iimb.ac.in/handle/2074/14169
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dc.contributor.authorDutta, Souvik
dc.contributor.authorBhalla, Manaswini
dc.contributor.authorChatterjee, Kalyan
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-25T14:30:23Z-
dc.date.available2020-08-25T14:30:23Z-
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.iimb.ac.in/handle/2074/14169-
dc.description.abstractLeader wishes to confront/overthrow the present regime and every period chooses the nature of its opposition. Opposition can either be a non-political protest or a political protest. The non-political protest does not threaten the existence of the present regime. The sucess or failure of both the types of protest depends upon the unknown ability of the leader and mass participation. We find that for intermediate ranges of the ability of the leader, it is optimal for the leader to follow a strategy of gradualism in which it undertakes non political protest initially to favorably update the belief about his ability and mobilize a higher participation for the political protest. For very low and high values of the ability of the leader, it is optimal to do the political protest in the first period.
dc.subjectPolitical science
dc.subjectPolitical leadership
dc.subjectSocial reforms
dc.titleSocial reform as path to political leadership: A dynamic model
dc.typePresentation
dc.relation.conferenceStony Brook Game Theory Festival, 17-21 July, 2017, Stony Brook, New York
Appears in Collections:2010-2019 P
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