Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://repository.iimb.ac.in/handle/2074/11659
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGhosh, Debabrata
dc.contributor.authorShah, Janat
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-20T13:43:15Z-
dc.date.available2020-04-20T13:43:15Z-
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn0925-5273
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.iimb.ac.in/handle/2074/11659-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we examine an apparel serial supply chain whose players initiate product “greening.” We consider situations in which the players cooperate or act individually. Our problem is motivated by recent developments in the supply chains of global apparel players. We build game theoretic models and show how greening levels, prices and profits are influenced by channel structures. We also study the impact of greening costs and consumer sensitivity towards green apparels. We propose a two-part tariff contract to coordinate the green channel. Our key contribution lies in the model of decision making of various supply chain structures and analyzing its impact on the players and supply chain. The problem throws interesting insights into the strategies of apparel players and their key decisions.
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.subjectApparel Industry
dc.subjectChannel Coordination
dc.subjectGame Theory
dc.subjectGreen Supply Chains
dc.titleA comparative analysis of greening policies across supply chain structures
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/J.IJPE.2011.05.027
dc.pages568-583p.
dc.vol.noVol.135-
dc.issue.noIss.2-
dc.journal.nameInternational Journal of Production Economics
Appears in Collections:2010-2019
Show simple item record

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.